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I. INTRODUCTION
An inventor's obligation to disclose the best mode of her invention is
strong consideration in the U.S. patent bargain, but the courts
t © 2002 by Steven B. Walmsley. All rights reserved.
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paradoxically define the scope of that obligation, thus rendering the
enforcement of U.S. patents unreasonably unpredictable. If an inventor
cannot reasonably foresee the scope of her obligation to disclose
invention details, then she is subjected to the costs and risks of either
overcompliance or undercompliance with the best mode requirement.
The scope of the best mode requirement should either be reliably defined
by an en banc ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or
the requirement should be discarded entirely by legislative action,
preferably as a sacrificial bargaining chip during future international
patent law harmonization efforts. Until then, however, an inventor should
overcomply with the best mode requirement to avoid having her patent
claims invalidated, or worse.
In light of the disservice that the best mode requirement currently
does to patent law, this article advocates a drastic legal change, either to
stabilize the scope of the best mode requirement and thus render it fit for
the purpose it was intended to serve,' or to discard the requirement alto-
gether. In addition, this article provides guidance for inventors in
complying with the unpredictable best mode requirement. Section II of
this article traces the evolution of the best mode requirement. Section III
extracts a plain language definition of best mode from the current statu-
tory and regulatory provisions. Then, the different standards of law
regarding the scope of invention disclosure are chronologically culled
from the case law in Section IV. Sections V and VI set forth a set of con-
clusions and recommendations, and, finally, Section VII provides a
summary of the key points of this article. The Appendix provides aids
for visualizing the author's suggested definition and scope of the best
mode requirement.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE BEST MODE REQUIREMENT
Before consulting modern patent law, this article explores the his-
torical perspectives on the best mode requirement. U.S. patent statutes
have always encompassed, and have slowly evolved to explicitly state,
what is now known as the best mode requirement. The original United
States patent statute included a patent infringement defense where a pat-
ent specification failed to contain the "whole of the truth" about the
1. See In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (the purpose of the best mode
requirement is to safeguard against the tendency to disclose only what inventors know to be
inferior modes, while retaining the best mode for themselves), overruled by In re Kirk, 376
F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (overruling Nelson on the issue of compliance with the 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 utility requirement, but not on the best mode issue).
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patentee's invention or discovery.2 The Patent Act of 1793 repealed and
modified the original patent statute, but essentially retained the whole of
the truth defense, rewording it but still requiring a patentee's specifica-
tion to contain the "whole truth" related to the patentee's discovery.3 In
other words, an alleged infringer could invalidate a patent where a pat-
entee neglected to disclose the whole truth relating to her discovery. An
ordinary language interpretation of the defense suggests that the phrase
"the whole truth" is a very broad requirement-broad enough to implic-
itly encompass a narrower requirement such as best mode.
The term "mode" was first used in the Patent Act of 1836, which re-
quired an inventor seeking a patent to explain the principle of a machine
and the "several modes" associated with the application of that principle,
as contemplated by the inventor.4 The Patent Act of 1870 similarly re-
quired the inventor to explain the principle of a machine and the "best
mode" contemplated that applies the principle Unfortunately, the Su-
preme Court failed to take the opportunity to accurately define the 1870
version of the best mode requirement.
In its 1875 decision of Sewall v. Jones, the Supreme Court addressed
the quality of a patentee's patent disclosure en route to invalidating the
patent on grounds of a lack of novelty.6 The Court stated "[t]he omission
to mention in the specification something which contributes only to the
degree of benefit... is not fatal, while the omission of what is known to
be necessary to the enjoyment of the invention is fatal."7 This statement
plainly ignores the addition of the best mode requirement that was en-
acted five years earlier. By definition the term "best" in the best mode
requirement is all about the degree of benefit that results from an inven-
tion or discovery, and specifically means the maximum degree of benefit.
Therefore, the Sewall Court erred by neglecting to consult the patent
statute that was amended to incorporate the requirement of a best mode.
Fortunately, the Sewall pronouncement on best mode was only dicta
since compliance with best mode was not directly at issue.'
However, the next Supreme Court pronouncement on the topic of
best mode was not dicta.. In the 1880 decision of Parks v. Booth, the
Supreme Court stated that an invention is "sufficiently described, . . . if
2. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 6, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793).
3. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836).
4. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1870).
5. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198 (emphasis added), amended by Pat-
ents, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
6. Sewall v. Jones, 91 U.S. 171 (1875).
7. Id. at 185-86 (emphasis added).
8. See id. at 187 (stating that a holding of noninfringement was decided on the issue of
lack of novelty).
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the devices of which it is composed are specifically named, their mode
of operation given, and the new and useful result ... pointed out . .. ."'
The Court applied this perfunctory rule, and held that the specification in
question complied with the statute.' Although the alleged infringers
specifically raised the best mode issue, the Supreme Court failed to even
briefly address the meaning or scope of the best mode requirement. In
light of the amended Patent Act of 1870, the Parks interpretation of a
patentee's disclosure obligation was incorrect because it ignored the new
and operative term "best" in the best mode requirement. Sewall and
Parks thus foreshadowed the difficulty that all courts would have in
defining the phrase best mode, and in calculating the requisite scope of
disclosure of the best mode requirement.
III. DEFINITION OF BEST MODE
This section first presents the most recent statutory provision of the
best mode requirement as embodied in the 1952 Patent Act," and as un-
changed by the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999.2 Then, this
section defines the phrase "best mode" both deductively and inductively,
first by contrast with the phrase "preferred embodiment" and with the
other statutory disclosure requirements, and then by assessing the plain
language definition of the phrase "best mode."
A. Deduced from the Statute
Under current patent law in the United States, an inventor who ap-
plies for a patent is obligated to disclose the "best mode ... of carrying
out" her invention.'3 Meeting this best mode requirement is similar to
performing an obligation in a "bargain" between the inventor and the
people of the United States.'4 This bargain is founded in the Constitution
of the United States, which explicitly provides to Congress the power to
"... promote the Progress of Science... by securing for limited times to
9. Parks v. Booth, 102 U.S. 96, 102 (1880).
10. Id. at 103.
II. Patents, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
12. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-
552 (1999).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
14. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer,
concurring) ("A patent can be conceived of as a contract between the inventor and the gov-
ernment. In return for full disclosure of the invention the government gives a monopoly of
sorts for a time."); see also Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (stating that the "... . best mode requirement creates a statutory bargained-for-
exchange..."), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1109 (2002).
... Inventors the exclusive right to their ... Discoveries ... ,," Under
this constitutional grant of power, Congress has enacted several patent
statutes over the centuries, the most recent of which promises inventors a
20-year right toexclude others from making, using, or selling the inven-
tor's invention as claimed in the inventor's patent.'6 The U.S. government
fulfills this promise to the inventor when a U.S. federal court upholds the
validity of the inventor's patent and grants relief to the inventor against a
proven infringer.
In consideration of the promise to grant the 20-year monopoly,
Congress set forth the other end of the patent bargain. The government
requests that inventors submit adequate disclosure of their claimed
invention to enable prosecution and issuance of a patent. A unilateral
contract is formed, at least conceptually, by the mutual consideration
inherent in the government's promise to provide a 20-year monopoly on
the inventor's discovery, and by the inventor's performance of the
government's request for compliance with invention disclosure
requirements.
An inventor's compliance with invention disclosure requirements en-
sures that the people of the United States receive something of value to
justify the 20-year monopoly on an invention. To that end, the applicable
statute requires inventors to include in their patent application:
a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it ... to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of car-
rying out his invention."
The applicable federal regulation does not explicitly define the
phrase "best mode" any further and essentially paraphrases the statute,
saying "[t]he best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention must be set forth."'8
i. Contrasted with "Preferred Embodiment"
One way to understand the best mode requirement is to understand
what it is not. The phrase "best mode" is often confusingly interchanged
with other phrases such as "preferred mode" or "preferred
15. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2000).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (emphasis added to highlight the trio of invention disclosure
requirements).
18. 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(b) (2000).
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embodiment."' 9 This is problematic because the term "mode" does not
equate precisely to the term "embodiment" as the former is broader than
the latter. An embodiment is that in which an idea is concretely
expressed. 20 Thus, an embodiment is something concrete or tangible,
which can be subject to several different modes of manufacture,
operation, implementation, uses of materials, etc. Furthermore, the term
"best" is somewhat less subjective than the term "preferred". In other
words, it is possible for an inventor to recognize that one mode is best
for the intended commercial goals of the invention, such as lowering the
cost and increasing the performance of the inventive subject matter. At
the same time, however, the inventor may nonetheless prefer a different
mode of the invention in accordance with a personal goal, such as
increasing the environmental friendliness of the inventive subject matter.
Thus, the terms "best" and "preferred" may be in conflict in the context
of patent law disclosure. Therefore, mutated phrases like "preferred
mode" or "preferred embodiment" should not be confused with the
statutory phrase "best mode," especially since there is no explicit
statutory requirement for a preferred embodiment or preferred mode.
ii. Contrasted with the "Description" and
"Enablement" Requirements
The best mode requirement is distinct from the enablement require-
ment, which in turn is distinct from the description requirement.' The
description of an invention is presumptively adequate upon filing and
involves a factual question of whether the inventor has provided a speci-
fication (as of the date of filing her patent application) that conveys with
reasonable clarity, to those of ordinary skill in the art, that the applicant
was in possession of her invention (as finally claimed).2 In other words,
the inventor must describe essentially "what" she has invented and may
not, after filing her patent application, attempt to reorient the claims be-
yond what was originally supported in the specification. In essence then,
the description requirement is a proscription on attempting to claim new
matter not originally disclosed.
In contrast, the enablement requirement presents a legal question of
whether the specification discloses information sufficient to enable one
19. See DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (a classic example
of the confusion. "Compliance with the best mode requirement exists when an inventor dis-
closes his preferred embodiment.").
20. See 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 164 (2d ed. 1989) (defining the term embodi-
ment), available at http://www.oed.com.
21. See In re Newton, 414 F2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969); accord Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar,
935 F2d 1555, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
22. Vas-Cath, Inc., 935 F2d at 1563-64.
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of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the claimed invention without
having to conduct undue experimentation to replicate the invention.23 In
this regard, disclosure of a working example is unnecessary, and even a
"prophetic example" based merely on predicted results may be suffi-
cient.24 In other words, the inventor must describe "how" the invention
can be reasonably replicated. A failure to set forth any mode whatsoever
would amount to non-enablement.25 Whether an inventor has disclosed
what the inventor feels is the best mode is a question separate and dis-
tinct from the question of the sufficiency of the disclosure.26
As an aid for visualizing the above-discussed contrasts between the
disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, the Appendix includes a
Venn diagram (hereinafter Diagram 1). Diagram 1 is self-explanatory if
reviewed with care and interest, but a cursory description follows as a
guide for the reader. For illustrative purposes, Diagram 1 uses a simple
and purely hypothetical example of the invention of an internal combus-
tion engine.
In Diagram 1, the prior art is represented by dashed-line circles near
the margins of the diagram. The largest circle represents the maximum
allowable scope of a claim of an invention, as constrained by the limits
of the prior art, and as supported by adequate disclosure of the invention
in compliance with the requirements of § 112. The overlapping circles
within the largest circle represent the first two of the trio of § 112 re-
quirements. On the left is the so-called description requirement and on
the right is the so-called enablement requirement.
The description circle includes three different tangible manifesta-
tions of the idea of the invention (embodiment 1, embodiment 2, and
embodiment 3) only one of which is considered the best: embodiment 2.
The enablement circle includes various ways of making and using the
different tangible manifestations of the invention, only one of each of
which is considered the best. As also reflected in the diagram, enable-
ment disclosure should also include various information including
invention testing results and calibration procedures, if developed as of
the filing date of the invention.
23. See Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261 (1916); see also In re Wands,
858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
24. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (stating that mere use of prophetic examples does not render a patent non-enabling); In
re Honn, 364 F.2d 454 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (explaining that the absence of a specific example is
not necessarily evidence that the best mode has not been disclosed).
25. See In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
26. See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also
In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
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In the hypothetical, the inventor has contemplated the following
three architectures of internal combustion engine: gas turbine, recipro-
cating-piston, and rotary-piston. At the time of filing the patent
application, the inventor personally prefers the gas turbine architecture
because she is fascinated by the interesting complexity of its operating
cycle. However, she contemplates that the reciprocating-piston architec-
ture, particularly a V-6 model, is best from a marketability standpoint.
Further, the V-6 embodiment is subject to a multitude of modes includ-
ing automatic or manual assembly, operation on gasoline or diesel fuel,
implementation in an automobile or in a boat, and composition of alumi-
num or iron.
Where the circles overlap is where the best alternatives of the de-
scription and enablement requirements meet to define the best mode of
the invention. The margin between the exterior of the overlapping circles
and the interior of the largest circle depicts where U.S. patent law allows
inventors and patent practitioners to have some latitude in complying
with the § 112 disclosure requirements. In other words, one need not
disclose every last detail of the invention that would be obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art27 and that would not require undue experimenta-
tion .
In summary, the best mode requirement is a subset that represents
the intersection of two larger sets-the written description and enable-
ment requirements. Thus, the best mode requirement is not limited to
just the "what" (description requirement) or the "how" (enablement re-
quirement) of an invention. Rather, the best mode requirement may well
be thought of as the "what best" and "how best" of an invention.
B. Induced by Ordinary Meaning
The definition of the phrase "best mode" may be better understood
with reference to the plain dictionary meanings of its constituent terms.
"Best" means "of the greatest usefulness for the purpose intended."29
"Mode" means the "manner in which a thing is done" ... 30 The word
"done", which is the past tense of the verb do, is perhaps one of the
broadest words in the English language, and thereby certainly includes
having done something such as embodied an idea in a tangible example,
made something, or used something. Within the context of patent law,
27. In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989); accord Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahur-
kar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
28. See W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F2d 1540, 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("A patent is invalid only when those skilled in the art are required to engage in undue
experimentation to practice the invention.") (emphasis original).
29. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 160 (6th ed. 1990).
30. Id. at 1003.
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the verbs make and use implicate the enablement requirement, while the
verb embody implicates the description requirement. Therefore, by its
ordinary meaning, best mode means the manner in which an invention is
embodied, made, and used that yields the greatest usefulness for the pur-
pose intended for the invention.
IV. SCOPE OF INVENTION DISCLOSURE NEEDED
TO SATISFY THE BEST MODE REQUIREMENT
This section analyzes case law in order to determine how much de-
tail an inventor needs to disclose to comply with the best mode
requirement. First, this section sets forth the procedural standards and
current substantive inquiries used by the courts. Then, this section exam-
ines a chronology of case law interpreting the modem best mode
statutory provision, wherein we discover a variety of conflicting stan-
dards of law that are deployed by the courts. Finally, this section
presents specific examples that illustrate the irreconcilable conflict of the
various standards of law.
A. Best Mode Analysis: Procedural and Substantive
Procedurally, the determination of compliance with the best mode
requirement is a question of fact and, thus, may be presented to a jury
31
where an alleged infringer has elected to defend herself using the best
mode requirement as a defense to patent infringement. The alleged in-
fringer bears the burden of proving that the inventor violated the best
mode requirement by meeting a standard of clear and convincing evi-
dence,32 which lies somewhere between the preponderance of the
evidence standard and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 3 The
trial court's factual findings will not be overturned on appeal unless
clearly erroneous 34 and, thus, as long as the best mode inquiry remains
one of fact, a jury finding is likely to be determinative of the issue. If,
however, the best mode inquiry involves ascertaining the scope of the
31. See Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
32. See id. at 1375 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d
1059, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
33. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "clear and convincing
proof').
34. See Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps, Inc., 850 F.2d 675 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating
that the district court's decision is reviewable for clear error).
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claims, then the best mode inquiry arguably becomes one of claim con-
struction, which is a question of law reviewed de novo.35
Substantively, the determination of compliance with the best mode
requirement involves analysis of who must disclose, when they must
disclose, and what they must disclose. By the plain language of the
statute, it is evident that best mode applies to only what the inventor
contemplated as best, and not what anyone else contemplated . However,
just because the inventor did not discover the best mode does not mean
that the inventor need not disclose it.3 In other words, if a co-worker of
the inventor reviews the inventor's invention disclosure and suggests a
better way of carrying out the invention and the inventor agrees, then the
inventor must disclose her co-worker's suggestion.
However, the inventor's obligations of disclosure do not include that
which is not known to the inventor, but that is known to the inventor's
assignee in general. For example, if the inventor's co-worker learns of
the inventor's disclosure and identifies a better mode, but the inventor
herself is not aware of that mode, then neither the inventor nor the as-
signee, is obliged to disclose it. The inventor's obligation to disclose the
best mode terminates as of the date offiling, and thereafter the inventor
need not update the application with a later-discovered best mode.39
What the inventor must disclose is analyzed under the second of two
inquiries of what is referred to as the "Chemcast test.' 40 The first inquiry
35. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); see also Michael R.
Franzinger, Best Mode Requirement: Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 165, 177 (proposing that best mode may now be more of a question of
law).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
37. See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l, Ltd., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1143 (N.D. Ill.
1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 716 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1989), and aff'd, 910 F.2d
804 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
38. See Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1051-52 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding
that knowledge of assignee is not imputed to the inventor. "Congress was aware of the differ-
ences between inventors and assignees ... and it specifically limited the best mode required to
that contemplated by the inventor. We have no authority to extend the requirement beyond the
limits set by Congress .... whether Glaxo deliberately walled off the inventor is irrelevant to
the issue of failure of his application to disclose the best mode known to him."), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 988 (1995).
39. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also In
re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 773 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (Judge Giles Rich overturning a decision that in-
validated a patent based on failure to comply with best mode based on the fact that the patent
failed to include details later found in the inventor's marketed product. Judge Rich noted that
"the patent law allows patent applications to be filed when in fact the invention has never been
reduced to commercial form. Commonly, they are filed long before commercial embodiments
reach the market.").
40. See Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990); accord Eli
Lilly and Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1109
(2002).
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is subjective and asks whether the inventor contemplated, at the time of
filing, a best mode of carrying out her invention.4' The second inquiry is
objective and asks whether the disclosure- is adequate to enable one
skilled in the art to practice the best mode. 2 If the answer to the first in-
quiry is no, then the analysis stops and no violation of the best mode can
be found. If, however, the answer to the first inquiry is yes and the an-
swer to the second inquiry is no, then the patent claim is invalid and the
alleged infringer prevails upon her best mode defense. Unfortunately, the
Chemcast test merely defines the best mode requirement in terms of the
enablement requirement and does not specify a more certain scope of
disclosure that would satisfy the best mode requirement.
Recently, another commentator has also recognized this problem of
an unresolved and uncertain scope of the best mode requirement and has
suggested that there are two ways of assessing the scope of best mode
disclosure, either using a "claims-only" standard, or a "necessity" stan-
dard. 3 According to the narrower claims-only standard, an inventor need
not disclose the best mode of non-claimed subject matter44-meaning
anything that is not an element explicitly recited in one of the claims.
According to the broader necessity standard, an inventor must disclose
all that is necessary to permit the public to achieve the benefit of her in-
vention.4 '5 As shown below, many learned judges of the courts have
vacillated between and beyond these definitions. Due to this vacillation,
the best mode disclosure requirement continues to confuse practitioners
and inventors. Next, this article explores some particularly noteworthy
cases that interpret, or misinterpret, the scope of the best mode disclo-
sure requirement.
B. Case Law Paradox: Claimed Elements Only, or Broader
This sub-section presents a chronology of the most pertinent patent
cases that specifically interpret the scope of the best mode requirement
per the modem statutory provision. The cases are briefly explored for
their teachings on the standard of law to be followed in assessing the
required scope of best mode disclosure. The Appendix includes Diagram
2 as an aid for visualizing the differences between the standards of the
scope of best mode disclosure, as cited and applied by the case law dis-
cussed below. The cases are from various jurisdictions, including the
United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and
41. Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 927-28.
42. Id. at 928.
43. Franzinger, supra note 35, at 166.
44. Id. at 166.
45. Id.
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Interferences ("BPAI"), various Federal District Courts, the First, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, the late United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA"), and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("CAFC"). The Supreme Court has not yet interpreted
the meaning, or scope, of the modern best mode statutory provision.
i. Pre Federal Circuit Creation
In 1960, the CCPA decided In re Nelson.46 The legendary Judge
Giles Rich,47 writing for the court, found compliance with the best mode
requirement where inventors disclosed not only claimed compounds, but
also how to make and how to use the claimed compounds. The court first
noted that it was undisputed that the inventors had fully described the
compounds and how to make them.48 Then the court addressed the con-
tested issue of whether the inventors disclosed how to use the
compounds. 49 The court found that the inventors had, "said to those
skilled in the art: Use [the claimed compounds] as intermediates to make
other steroids having analogous structures; you can do this [using] meth-
ods which you already know about. 50 Later in the opinion Judge Rich
summarized this position stating that:
compliance with the law does not necessarily require specific
recitations of use but may be inherent in description or may re-
sult from disclosure of a sufficient number of properties to make
a use obvious; and where those of ordinary skill in the art will
know how to use, the applicant has a right to rely on such
knowledge.5
Judge Rich required that the methods of making and using the inven-
tion be disclosed, even though such methods were not claimed, based on
the idea that any subject matter, non-obvious to those of ordinary skill in
the art and relating to the methods of making and using an invention,
must be disclosed to satisfy the best mode requirement.52 In summary, it
46. In re Nelson, 280 F2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled by In Re Kirk, 376 E2d 936
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (overruling Nelson on the issue of compliance with the 35 U.S.C. § 101 util-
ity requirement, but not on the best mode issue).
47. The late Judge Rich was a drafter of the 1952 Patent Act, was the oldest active federal
judge, and is still considered the dean of modern patent law. See Oldest Active Federal Judge
Dies, 31 THIRD BRANCH 5 (July 1999), at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jul99ttb/oldest.html
(last visited on Nov. 30, 2002).
48. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 175.
49. Id. at 177.
50. Id. at 182.
51. Id. at 184-85 (emphasis omitted).
52. See id. at 185.
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is clear that Judge Rich and the CCPA did not limit the requisite scope of
best mode disclosure to that of the claims-only standard.
1965 was the first year in which an appellate court invalidated a pat-
ent for failure to comply with the best mode requirement and involved
subject matter that was nonclaimed." In Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line
Manufacturing Co., the Seventh Circuit invalidated a patent for failing to
describe a non-claimed special tool used to produce fine concentricity on
one component for achieving an "essential" sealing relationship with
another component.14 Thus, Flick-Reedy established what the author
suggests is an essentiality standard of law, such that any item mentioned
in the disclosure that is used to achieve an essential element of the inven-
tion is subject to the best mode disclosure requirement, regardless of
whether or not the item is claimed.
One year later, the CCPA ruled independently of, but similarly to,
the Flick-Reedy essentiality standard." In In re Bosy, the Patent Office
accused inventors of failing to disclose the exact amount of ingredients
involved in a method for recovering juice from grape mash. Unlike Flick
Reedy, the Bosy decision did not inquire into whether the undisclosed
subject matter fell within the claim language. Rather, the CCPA taught in
Bosy that a specification need not set forth, "details not relating to the
essence of the invention."56 Hence, Bosy applies the essentiality standard.
In 1972, the CCPA reviewed a best mode rejection of a patent appli-
cation claiming a chemical blend comprised of two separate starting
materials: uniformly random ethylene-methacrylic acid copolymer and
polyethylene 7 The court reversed the rejection, stating that best mode
inquiries pertain to carrying out the invention, which was the blend and
not the starting materials. 8 However, the starting materials were explic-
itly set forth within claim 1 of the invention.59 Therefore, it is difficult to
see why the starting materials did not pertain to carrying out the inven-
tion if they were in fact spelled out within the scope of the very invention
claimed. Given this logical disconnect, the Brebner holding should be
limited to the specific facts of the case.
In 1976, the First Circuit modified the essentiality standard to up-
hold the validity of a patent where the inventor failed to disclose a
proprietary formula for a non-claimed compound that was used to make
53. Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
54. See id. at 550 (emphasis added).
55. In re Bosy, 360 F.2d 972 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
56. Id. at 976 (emphasis added).
57. In re Brebner, 455 F.2d 1402 (C.C.RA. 1972).
58. Id. at 1404.
59. See id. at 1403.
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wire insulation, a claimed element. 6° The court decided that the proprie-
tary formula was "not essential" to making the invention, in that it
merely reduced the cost of making the invention.6'
In 1977, the Sixth Circuit decided Union Carbide Corp. v. Borg-
Warner Corp., holding that a best mode violation occurs where the
invention is a process and an inventor fails to disclose known and non-
claimed apparatuses that improve, and that are an "integral" part of, the
process.62 Specifically, the inventor failed to disclose the existence, at the
time of filing, of an improved version of a non-claimed valve apparatus
that was used to achieve a claimed injection molding process. 6 The term
"integral" is closely synonymous with the term "essential" 6 and, thus,
the Sixth Circuit basically followed the essentiality standard of law.
In 1980, the CCPA held in In re Sherwood that no best mode viola-
tion occurred where an inventor failed to disclose a non-claimed
computer program used in carrying out 'the claimed invention. 6 The
CCPA stated that a best mode violation requires that the quality of an
inventor's best mode disclosure is "so poor as to effectively result in
concealment.' 66 To buttress this rather vague recital of a standard, the
court cited Union Carbide as a "similar standard" applied by other
courts. 67 The court paraphrased Union Carbide, stating that the generic
disclosure of an apparatus was insufficient best mode disclosure where
the inventor considered an undisclosed special type of apparatus to be
"necessary and desirable for practice of the [claimed process]."68 Thus, it
is reasonable to conclude that the Sherwood court somewhat broadened
the essentiality standard and thereby established the necessity standard,
which was recently recognized and coined by one commentator.
69
In 1981, the BPAI declined to follow the Sherwood case in Magdo v.
Peltzer.70 The BPAI held that no best mode violation occurred, and stated
60. See Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 886 (1976).
61. Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
62. Union Carbide Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 550 F.2d 355, 361 (6th Cir. 1977) (em-
phasis added).
63. See id.
64. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 606 (10th ed. 2002) (defining the term
integral as "essential to completeness" and "lacking nothing essential") available at
http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/.
65. In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
66. Id. at 816.
67. Id. at 816 n.5.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. See Franzinger, supra note 35.
70. Magdo v. Peltzer, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 838 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Bd. Pat. Intf.
1981), aff'd in part and vacated in part by Magdo v. Kooi, 699 F2d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(declining to review best mode issue since untimely raised).
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that an inventor need not "disclose the 'best mode' contemplated by him
for solving those problems encountered by the prior art which extend
beyond his specific contribution as claimed . . . ."" In other words, the
court opined that an inventor need not disclose the best mode for non-
claimed subject matter. Thus, the BPAI followed Brebner in narrowing
the required scope of best mode disclosure to that subject matter within
the claims only.
Less than one year later, in .1982, the BPAI used a standard that con-
flicts with the Magdo claims-only standard and found a best mode
violation regarding subject matter beyond the invention as claimed .
This time, the BPAI invalidated a patent where an inventor did not dis-
close -non-claimed, but novel, subject matter. The inventor failed to
disclose a novel intermediate compound that was "part and parcel" to
carrying out the claimed compound. 73 The phrase "part and parcel" was
defined by the term "essential". 74 Thus, the BPAI broadened their prior
interpretation of the scope of best mode disclosure to any subject matter,
claimed or non-claimed, that is both novel and essential.
ii. Post Federal Circuit Creation
Later in 1982, Congress merged the United States Court of Claims
and the CCPA to create the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.75 As
of October 1, 1982, the CAFC is bound to follow the CCPA standards of
law since the CAFC adopted the body of law established by the prede-
cessor CCPA as precedent.76 This theoretically obligated the CAFC to
employ either the Nelson or Sherwood standard of law regarding the
requisite scope of best mode disclosure. Even if Nelson is viewed as an
overruled case, or even if the best mode analysis therein is treated as
dicta,77 then the necessity standard of Sherwood should have been ap-
plied, until overruled by the CAFC sitting en banc. 1
71. Id. at 845.
72. See Clayton v. Akiba, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 374 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Bd. Pat. Intf.
1982).
73. Id. at 381.
74. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 845 (10th ed. 2002) (defining the
phrase part and parcel as "an essential or integral component. ), available at
http://www.m-w.com.
75. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 122-127, 96 Stat.
25, 36-39 (1982).
76. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
77. See supra note 39.
78. See Mother's Restaurant, Inc. v. Mama's Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (stating "The court may overrule a prior holding having precedential status only by an
in banc [sic] decision."); see also YBM Magnex, Inc. v. ITC, 145 F.3d 1317, 1319 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) ("Subsequent panel opinions may elaborate and refine and thus advance the evolu-
tion of judge-made law, but they can not change the law as established in prior rulings.");
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Surprisingly, in its 1985 decision in DeGeorge v. Bernier, a panel of
the CAFC bypassed both the precedent CCPA decisions of Nelson and
Sherwood and instead used a standard first set forth by the BPAI.79
Moreover, of the two conflicting BPAI standards available, the CAFC
employed the claims-only standard consistent with the older BPAI deci-
sion in Magdo, rather than the essentiality standard consistent with the
more recent BPAI decision in Clayton. Nevertheless, the court held that
failure to meet the best mode requirement should not arise from an ab-
sence of information on a non-claimed element.0 DeGeorge was thus the
first instance in which the CAFC limited the best mode disclosure re-
quirement to only that subject matter that falls within the scope of the
claims.
Two years later, a completely different panel of the CAFC effec-
tively ignored the DeGeorge standard in Christianson v. Colt Industries
Operating Corp., but, like the DeGeorge panel, found no best mode vio-
lation where an inventor failed to disclose non-claimed subject matter.8 '
Strangely, this CAFC panel cited authority from the Tenth Circuit-a
non-precedential jurisdiction. Based solely on a jurisdictional dispute,
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the CAFC's Christianson de-
cision with instructions to transfer the case back to the Seventh Circuit
by the Supreme Court.83 The Seventh Circuit deferred to the CAFC best
mode analysis stating that "the focus of the best mode requirement ... is
on the claimed invention"84 and quoted from the CAFC saying that the
undisclosed element of "interchangeability ... appears nowhere as a
limitation in any claim . . .. ,8 Thus, the Seventh Circuit bypassed its
own precedent of Flick-Reedy by adopting the CAFC's claims-only
standard.
Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Where conflicting statements
•.. appear in our precedent, the panel is obligated to review the cases and reconcile or explain
the statements, if possible. If not reconcilable and if not merely conflicting dicta, the panel is
obligated to follow the earlier case law which is the binding precedent."); Newell Cos., Inc. v.
Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[P]rior decisions of a panel of the
court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless and until overturned en banc....
Where there is direct conflict, the precedential decision is the first.") (citation omitted).
79. DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
80. See id. at 1325.
81. Christiansen v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 484 U.S. 985 (1987), vacated, 486 U.S. 800 (1988), and transferred to 870 F.2d 1292
(7th Cir. 1989).
82. Id. at 1563 (citing Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Oklahoma, Inc.,
607 F2d 885, 897 (10th Cir. 1979)).
83. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1988).
84. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 E2d 1292, 1301 (7th Cir. 1989).
85. Id. at 1302 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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Incidentally, the Seventh Circuit's Christianson opinion expressed
that "the best mode requirement is intended to allow the public to com-
pete fairly with the patentee following the expiration of the patents."
86
Unfortunately, this proposition is incompatible with confining, the scope
of the best mode requirement to that of the claims alone because it
would expand the requisite scope of best mode disclosure far beyond
that of the claims-only and necessity standards. This is because placing
responsibility on an inventor to enable the public to competitively em-
ploy the invention following the expiration of a patent would be an
unreasonable burden on the inventor not contemplated by the statute. It
would effectively obligate the inventor to continuously update her dis-
closure with new matter until her patent expired. Specifically, the
inventor would be obligated to disclose far more detail than just the best
mode of her invention, including production conditions and tolerances,
distribution methods, etc. If the best mode requirement were intended to
do such a broad service to the public, then the statute would require an
inventor to continuously supply the public with updated best mode dis-
closures so that the public would be current with the inventor's state of
the art as of the expiration of the patent. Such a requirement would also
be impractical since there are too many other factors that influence
whether the public could effectively compete, such as manufacturing and
distribution strategy and efficiency, marketing appeal, etc. Perhaps what
was meant to be expressed is that the best mode requirement is intended
to allow the public to competitively replicate the invention, as best em-
ployed by the inventor, measured at the time of filing the patent
application. This would permit the inventor's competitors to initiate their
own improvements to the invention upon publication of the patent appli-
cation or issuance of the patent and, fairly enough, would permit the
inventor a head start roughly equal to the time of prosecution of the pat-
ent application.
In 1988, a CAFC panel majority expanded the scope of best'mode
disclosure beyond the claims-only standard in Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus
Corp.87 In analyzing compliance with the best mode requirement, the
Randomex panel overlooked the scope of disclosure standards. of the
Nelson, Sherwood, DeGeorge, and Christianson cases. Instead, the court
employed a "quality of disclosure" standard wherein a best mode is con-
cealed if the quality of the disclosure is "so poor as to effectively result
in concealment."88 Under this quality of disclosure analysis, the court
86. Id. at 1302 n.8.
87. Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
88. Id. at 589 (citing Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1536 (Fed.
Cir. 1987)).
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found that disclosure of the trade name of a non-claimed element (clean-
ing fluid) was sufficient to satisfy the best mode requirement because
there were commercial substitutes that were readily available. In other
words, the court determined that the best mode requirement was satisfied
since the inventor had disclosed the preferred trade name for the clean-
ing fluid such that a competitor could replicate the invention and practice
the best mode simply by purchasing the inventor's proprietary cleaning
fluid.
Incidentally, the Randomex court offered a hypothetical that makes
the best mode requirement easier to understand. The court hypothesized
that if one should invent a new and improved internal combustion en-
gine, then the best mode requirement would require the inventor to
divulge the fuel on which the engine runs best.89 Even though the fuel is
not a claimed element of the invention, it is needed for carrying out the
best mode of the invention. Similarly, the Randomex court acknowledged
that the inventor in the case at hand failed to disclose the exact proprie-
tary formula of the cleaning fluid that was "needed to practice the
invention" even though the cleaning fluid was "not claimed specifi-
cally."9 Thus, in addition to the quality of disclosure standard, the
Randomex panel implicitly relied on the necessity standard in deciding
the case.
Later in 1988, a panel of the CAFC found a best mode violation in
Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. Partnership."' Several months before filing his
patent application, the inventor evaluated various surface treatments of a
valve-stem seal through testing. The tests revealed that fluoridation of
the rubber valve-stem seals yielded the best results. Accordingly, the in-
ventor suggested disclosure of the surface treatment, but his patent
counsel elected not to disclose the non-claimed treatment because it was
"'not part of the case' ,92 (i.e. not an element of any of the claims in the
patent). Thus, the inventor's patent counsel failed to disclose a non-
claimed chemical treatment of a claimed element wherein the treatment
was "necessary" to ensure the satisfactory performance of the inven-
tion.93 The CAFC concluded that the fact that the seal treatment was
widely known in the prior art was no defense to the best mode violation.
In other words, the fact that the seal treatment was not novel did not pro-
vide a best mode violation defense, in contrast to such rationale in
89. See id. at 590 n.*.
90. Id. at 586 (emphasis added).
91. Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. P'ship, 860 F.2d 415 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at418.
93. Id. (emphasis in original).
Clayton. Specifically, the court opined that the "best mode requirement
is not satisfied by reference to the level of skill in the art .... 
04
In 1990, a panel of the CAFC decided Chemcast Corp. v. Arco In-
dustries Corp., which is significant in at least two respects.95 First, the
court implicitly advocated use of the necessity standard. In Chemcast,
the undisclosed subject matter at issue was indeed claimed, albeit very
broadly. It was dictum then, when the court opined that most best mode
violations addressed by the CAFC had involved failures to disclose
"non-claimed elements that were nevertheless necessary [to the inven-
tion]. ' 96 Therefore, the court implicitly conceded the use and validity of
the necessity standard. Second, Chemcast is the case in which the cur-
rent two-step best mode analysis originated, of which the first prong is
key to this discussion. The court stated that the first prong of the inquiry
"resolves whether the inventor must disclose any facts in addition to
those sufficient for enablement. '97 This means that even the scope of the
disclosure needed to satisfy the enablement requirement is not limited to
the scope of the claims. This is true because methods of making and us-
ing an invention, per enablement, are not always claimed but they are
always required to be disclosed. Therefore, the phrase in the Chemcast
opinion stating "facts in addition to those sufficient for enablement 98
necessarily includes those facts extending beyond enablement and, thus,
also those facts extending beyond the scope of the claims. Therefore, in
addition to the dictum, the first prong of Chemcast implicitly says that
best mode disclosure necessarily requires subject matter beyond that
which falls within the scope of the claims alone.
One year later, a panel of the CAFC regressed to the DeGeorge
claims-only standard in Engel Industries, Inc. v. Lockformer.99 There, no
best mode violation was found where the inventor failed to disclose a
non-claimed crimping procedure that was used to reinforce claimed
snap-fit ductwork. The court could have found no best mode violation
merely using the necessity rule, since the crimping procedure was not
conclusively deemed necessary until commercialization, well after filing
the patent application.' °° The court, however, went out of its way to find
no best mode violation in commenting that "[u]nclaimed subject matter
is not subject to the disclosure requirements of § 1 12."''
94. Id. at 419.
95. See Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
96. Id. at 928 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer, 946 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
100. See id. at 1532-33.
101. Id. at 1531.
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A few months later, a completely different panel of the CAFC once
again changed direction and disregarded the DeGeorge and Engel
claims-only standard in Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc.10 2 The
panel stated that non-claimed materials and techniques used for
manufacturing a claimed device "may or may not be required" to satisfy
the best mode requirement.' 3 Thus, if an inventor knows of a method of
manufacture "which substantially improves the operation or
effectiveness of his invention, failure to disclose such peripheral
development may well lead to invalidation".' °4
In Wahl, the inventor failed to disclose information including a
known molding technique using a known resin material to carry out the
invention. The court found that such information "was no more than a
routine manufacturing choice," 5 and held as improper the trial court's
summary judgment of failure to disclose the best mode. In distinguishing
Dana on the facts, the Wahl court highlighted that the known, non-
claimed technique in Dana affected how well the claimed invention
worked, whereas the known and routine non-claimed matter in Wahl did
not have such an effect.' ,Thus, in contemplating peripheral subject mat-
ter within the scope of best mode disclosure, Wahl did not employ the
claims-only standard, but instead employed and qualified the necessity
standard of Dana.
Several years later, a panel of the CAFC asked in Zygo Corp. v. Wyko
Corp., "[w]hat is a 'mode' of the 'invention'?" and "[w]hat [is] meant
... by the phrase 'carrying out the invention'?' '0 7 The panel concluded
that best mode inquiry is "set by the CLAIMS", per Engel.'0 8 The inven-
tor in Zygo failed to disclose a non-claimed protective casing for his
claimed interferometer. In applying the Engel claims-only standard to
the facts of the case, the court stated that the non-claimed enclosure was
not subject to best mode disclosure since it was "not a necessary part of
this invention . .. ."'0 Despite citing the Engel claims-only standard, the
term "necessary" implies that if the enclosure had been necessary, al-
though still non-claimed, disclosure of the enclosure would have been
required. As such, Zygo cited the claims-only standard as controlling, but
applied the Dana necessity standard to the facts.'"
102. Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
103. Id. at 1579.
104. Id: (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 1580.
106. See id.
107. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F3d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1568 (emphasis added).
110. Id.
Later in 1996, a panel of the CAFC attempted to broaden the scope
of best mode disclosure to the extreme in its decision in Great Northern
Corp. v. Henry Molded Products, Inc."' In assessing the requisite scope
of best mode disclosure, the panel far exceeded the necessity standard by
stating that the.best mode issue that a court must determine is whether
non-claimed features "relate to the claimed invention . 7.. ," The court
applied this new "relation" standard to the facts and found that non-
claimed strengthening ribs that were formed into sheet material not only
related to the claimed invention, but were "critical to practicing the
claimed invention . . . .""' Thus, the panel originated a very broad "rela-
tion" standard, but then implicitly applied a narrower "criticality"
standard to the facts in deciding the case based on critical, non-claimed
elements. Because the term "critical" is closely synonymous with the
term "essential"'"4 , the author suggests that Great Northern is best cate-
gorized with the cases employing the essentiality standard, including
Flick-Reedy, Bosy, International Telephone, Union Carbide, and Sher-
wood.
In 1997, a panel of the CAFC invoked the necessity standard in Ro-
botic Vision Systems, Inc. v. View Engineering, Inc. and thereby avoided
the DeGeorge claims-only standard."' The panel found no best mode
violation when the inventor failed to disclose software necessary for con-
trolling a device where the software was not an element of the claims." 6
However, the panel said "the fact that the use of [something] is not men-
tioned in the claims ... does not ... exempt such use from the
requirements of a best mode disclosure, since carrying out the invention
usually involves more than what is expressly claimed.""' 7 Qualifying this
statement further, the court concluded that one skilled in the art would
have known that the undisclosed, non-claimed subject matter was the
best mode of carrying out the invention. In other words, like Judge Rich
in the Nelson case, the panel decided that non-claimed, but obvious, sub-
ject matter is not subject to explicit disclosure under best mode.
I 11. Great N. Corp. v. Henry Molded Prod., Inc., 94 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
112. Id. at 1572 (emphasis added).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 396 (10th ed.) (defining the term
essential as "basic, indispensable, necessary"; MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
275 (10th ed.) (defining the term critical as "crucial, decisive.., indispensable, vital......
115. Robotic Vision Sys. Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 112 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001).
116. See id. at 1165 ("We conclude that.. . the specification is not deficient concerning
the disclosure of the best mode").
117. Id. at 1166 (emphasis added).
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One year later, in Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. Surgical
Corp, a panel of the CAFC qualified the necessity standard."8 The
Applied Medical panel stated that an inventor is not required to disclose
a non-claimed element that is necessary to the operation of a larger-
overall device in which the invention is deployed, but that is not
necessary to the operation of the invention itself."9 By implication then,
best mode disclosure would be required for a non-claimed element that
is necessary to the operation of just the invention itself. Thus, the
Applied Medical panel employed and qualified the necessity standard.
Subsequent to the above decision, a couple of noteworthy district
court cases applied the necessity standard. In 1999, the Federal District
Court of Rhode Island interpreted CAFC standards of law on the requi-
site scope of best mode disclosure in Access Solutions International, Inc.
v. Data/Ware Development, Inc.120 The court held that specifically
claimed elements are definitely subject to the best mode requirement and
that non-claimed elements may also be subject to the best mode re-
quirement if they are "necessary to implement the claimed invention."'
2'
The District Court found it important that the claimed invention simply
would not function without the allegedly non-claimed element, thus im-
plying that any element necessary to the utility of the invention,
regardless if present in the claims, must be disclosed in detail to comply
with the best mode requirement.
In 2000, the Federal District Court of New Jersey was inclined to-
ward the claims-only standard of Engel, but ultimately applied a
different standard in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Boehringer Ingelheim
Corp.'22 The district court initially cited the claims-only standard of
Engel, but then qualified it by invoking the necessity standard via a deci-
sion by its sister court in Rhode Island, stating that "[u]nclaimed
elements, however, 'may also be subject to the [best mode] requirement
if they are necessary to implement the claimed invention.' ,,123 Toward the
end of its analysis, the court finally explicitly followed the necessity
rule, concluding that "the best mode defense is not confined to claim
limitations."'
24
118. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 147 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 524 U.S. 1104 (1999).
119. See id. at 1377.
120. Access Solutions Int'l, Inc. v. Data/Ware Dev., Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.R.I. 1999).
121. Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
122. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 85 F. Supp. 2d 420
(D.N.J. 2000).
123. Id. at 422 (quoting Access Solutions, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 98) (emphasis removed).
124. Id.
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Later in 2000, a CAFC panel decided Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Sam-
sung Electronics Co., 125 citing the claims-only standard of Engel and
attempting to reconcile it with the necessity standard of Dana. The court
first stated that "the contours of the best mode requirement are defined
by the scope of the claimed invention ...,,12 The court then attempted to
distinguish Dana by stating:
Dana [is] different from the present case because [it] involved a
situation in which the omitted best mode related directly to the
claimed invention ... Dana [is] consistent with other decisions
of this court in which we have held that nonclaimed matter that
is unrelated to the operation of the claimed invention does not
trigger the best mode requirement. 
2
1
By implication then, the panel was saying that if matter is related to
the operation of the claimed invention, even if the matter is not claimed,
it must be disclosed pursuant to the best mode requirement, consistent
with other CAFC decisions.
In Northern Telecom, it was undisputed that the inventors failed to dis-
close a best mode for preventing a quality problem in fine-line etching of
semiconductor material.'28 It was also not disputed that fine-line etching
was preferred for producing semiconductors.' 29 What was disputed was
whether the claims were even drafted to cover producing fine-line semi-
conductors and, thus, whether it was necessary to teach the best mode to
accomplish same. If the patentees did not dispute that they, like the rest of
their industry, preferred fine-line etching, then the claims were necessar-
ily drawn for fine-line etching since such was the inherent object of
those in the art. Thus, the object in Dana (leak-free sealing) and the ob-
ject in Northern Telecom (fine-line etching) were both indisputably
preferred in their respective industries. If it was necessary to disclose
best mode details to accomplish the non-claimed object of leak-free seal-
ing in Dana, then it likewise should have been necessary to disclose the
analogous best mode details to accomplish the non-claimed object of
fine-line etching in Northern Telecom, as the District Court found. In-
stead, the panel applied the claims-only standard and found no best
mode violation.
Later in 2000, in another noteworthy trial court case, the District
Court of New Jersey declined to cite the preceding CAFC case, Northern
Telecom, and instead relied on its own earlier pronouncement from
125. N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,215 F3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
126. Id. at 1286.
127. Id. at 1288 (emphasis added).
128. See id. at 1287.
129. See id. at 1285.
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Bristol-Myers Squibb.'30 The court stated that "best mode analysis is not
strictly limited to claim limitations,"'3 ' and that "[a] best mode violation
exists only when the undisclosed element affects how the invention
works."'3 2 This is equivalent to saying that the best mode of an
undisclosed element must be included if that undisclosed element is
necessary to the intended operation of the invention. Thus, the court
rebuked the claims-only standard and effectively applied the necessity
standard.
In 2001, a different panel of the CAFC also passed on the opportu-
nity to follow Northern Telecom's claims-only standard and instead
employed the necessity standard in Mentor HIS, Inc. v. Medical Device
Alliance, Inc.'33 Here, a majority of the judges of the panel invoked the
necessity standard consistent with their own ruling in the previously de-
cided Applied Medical case, 3 4 saying that the inventor is "only obliged
to disclose unclaimed elements when they are necessary to the operation
of the invention.""'3 The Mentor panel reversed a finding of a best mode
violation where an inventor failed to disclose stabilization circuitry that
was important to carrying out a liposuction procedure as intended. The
panel concluded that although the inventor admitted that the circuit was
important, the inventor did not consider the circuit to be a necessary part
of the invention.'36 Therefore the court held that the inventor need not
disclose the unnecessary circuit to comply with the best mode require-
ment.
Later in 2001, another panel of the CAFC significantly narrowed the
necessity standard in Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Labs by stating that non-
claimed subject matter is not subject to best mode disclosure unless the
non-claimed subject matter is not only necessary, but "essential" and
"novel".'37 Incidentally, the terms "essential" and "novel" originally de-
rive from the Flick-Reedy and Clayton decisions respectively.' The Eli
Lilly standard, however, is effectively the same as that used in Clayton.'39
130. See SDS USA, Inc. v. Ken Specialties, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 533, 548 (D.N.J.
2000).
131. Id. at 548.
132. Id. at 549.
133. Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
134. Id. at 1375.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See id.
137. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Labs, 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1109 (2002).
138. See Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966); Clayton v. Akiba, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 374 (Pat. & Trademark
Off. Bd. Pat. Intf. 1982).
139. See Clayton, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 374.
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The Eli Lilly panel upheld'trial court findings of no best mode viola-
tions where the inventor failed to disclose the synthesization method of a
disclosed intermediate compound and also failed to disclose the pre-
ferred solvent for the disclosed step of purifying the claimed invention,
Prozac®.140 The Eli Lilly panel attempted to reconcile the Dana case on
the facts. At first glance, the Dana case seems factually analogous to Eli
Lilly in that the inventor's patent in Dana was also questioned for non-
disclosure of a chemical and a non-claimed pretreatment of a disclosed
material. Here, unlike in Dana, the inventors in Eli Lilly at least dis-
closed the presence of the preferred chemical and the presence of the
treatment or purification of the disclosed material. In any event, if the
recent novelty and essentiality standard of Eli Lilly were retroactively
applied to the facts of Dana, the patent in Dana would not have been
invalidated for a best mode violation. This is because the chemical and
surface treatment were indisputably not novel in the industry. Also, the
Eli Lilly court, unlike the Dana court, permitted itself to reference the
ordinary skill in the art when it stated that "one of ordinary skill in the
art possessed the requisite knowledge to select a solvent [for purifying
the claimed invention]."' 4' Despite the panel's attempts to reconcile Dana
to the present case, the standards of law that set the requisite scope of
best mode disclosure have now reached a point of irreconcilability.
In June of 2002, the CAFC decided Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North
America Corp., 14 which sustained the confusion and uncertainty sur-
rounding the definition of the phrase best mode and the requisite scope
necessary to comply with the best mode requirement. The Teleflex panel
upheld summary judgment of no best mode violation, despite the fact
that the inventor admitted that the best way to make his invention in-
volved various undisclosed details regarding material selection and
matching.'4 3 Counsel for the inventor successfully argued that the mate-
rial details were only critical in meeting customer requirements and that
the invention would work without such requirements.'"
The problem here is that such an argument goes to enablement-not
to best mode. Based on the definitions set forth above in section III, get-
ting the invention to "work" is an enablement issue, whereas getting the
invention to "work better" pertains to the degree of benefit that the inven-
tion provides, which is a best mode issue.'45 In other words, if the
invention works better in the presence of certain material characteristics-
140. Prozac® is a registered trademark of Eli Lilly and Company.
141. See Eli Lilly and Co., 251 F.3d at 966.
142. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.299 E3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
143. Id. at 1321.
144. Id. at 1322.
145. See Section III, infra.
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and the inventor contemplated same at the time of filing-then such mate-
rial details must be disclosed to satisfy the best mode requirement.
The Teleflex court held that because the best mode information in-
volved unclaimed subject matter, there was no best mode violation. 46 The
Teleflex panel expressed that their analysis of compliance with the best
mode requirement "must begin and remain focused on the language of the
claim."' 47 Thus, the Court asserted that the best mode inquiry is effectively
measured by the claims and cited cases that applied the claims-only stan-
dard, such as Engel, Northern Telecom, and Christianson.
The analysis, however, quickly diverged from the claim language by
conceding that the CAFC has previously found violations of the best mode
requirement regarding undisclosed, unclaimed subject matter when there
is a "strong relationship" of such subject matter to the claimed invention.
48
Thus, the Teleflex analysis conceded that best mode analysis may tran-
scend claim language, while at the same time attempting to apply what it
perceived to be a claims-only standard. The court held that the best mode
requirement was not violated where undisclosed information related to
production details dictated by specific consumer requirements and did not
fall within the scope of the claims.'49 The court left unresolved the issue of
whether a best mode violation might occur where an inventor does not
disclose non-claimed production details not mandated by the customer.
Based on the court's "strong relationship" language, the best mode re-
quirement would be violated by a failure to disclose information that is
more important than just a mere production detail--even though such in-
formation was not claimed. One might conclude that, despite the
application of the claims-only standard, the real issue in Teleflex was not
whether the undisclosed material details were within the claim language
but, rather, whether such details bore enough of a "strong relationship" to
the claim language beyond that of mere production details. Thus, Teleflex
further illustrates that there remains plenty of uncertainty in assessing the
scope of the best mode requirement.
Only two months after Teleflex was decided, the state of the best mode
requirement worsened with Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, Inc.50
The court created and applied yet another new standard of assessing the
scope of best mode disclosure in holding that a patent was not invalid for
failing to disclose preferred method steps in making ciprofloxacin, better
known as Cipro®-the anthrax antibiotic.'' Three primary steps were re-
146. Id. at 1330.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1331.
149. Id. at 1333.
150. Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
151. Cipro® is a registered trademark of Bayer Akteingesellschaft Joint Stock Company.
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quired to make Cipro®, including: 1) synthesis of a starting material,
2) chemical reaction of the starting material to yield an intermediate mate-
rial, and 3) addition of an amine to the intermediate material to yield the
end product Cipro®.1 2 Neither step one nor the starting material itself
were disclosed in the original patent application yet they were necessary to
make the end product'53, and they were novel and indeed protected by a
separate patent.
54
In examining best mode case law, the court overlooked the precedent
of Nelson, cited the strange CCPA decision of Brebner as the earliest
statement on restricting best mode disclosure to that of the claims only,'55
and then invoked the DeGeorge claims-only standard set by the CAFC.1
6
Nonetheless, the court attempted to reconcile the cases that have been de-
cided using standards other than the claims-only standard.'57 In so doing,
the court examined cases in which a best mode violation occurred and ex-
tracted a broad best mode standard. The court ruled that the best mode
requirement is violated where one fails to disclose a preferred embodiment
or where one fails to disclose a preference that materially affects the mak-
ing or using of the invention-regardless of whether the subject matter
falls within the bounds of the claims.'58
152. See id. at 1310.
153. Id. (The court stated that a "person of skill (sic) in the art" could have readily ob-
tained the starting material by a routine search of the chemical literature, thereby implying
that disclosure of step one was not necessary to carry out the invention. There are problems
with this implication. First, the court failed to specify one of ordinary skill as the standard.
Second, the inventor was a doctor in the art and a prolific inventor and thus obviously ex-
ceeded the level of ordinary skill, yet even he needed assistance from a co-inventor in order to
make the claimed end-product. Up until the development of step one, the inventor could not
produce ciprofloxacin. In other words, at the time the application was filed, but for the special
assistance of his co-inventor with step one, the claimed end-product was out of reach of the
inventor. Thus, the inventor's failure to disclose the novel, and apparently difficult, step one
not only violated the best mode requirement, but also violated the enablement requirement. In
fact, the Brebner opinion requires that "[a] method of making starting materials not known in
the art must be set forth in order to comply with the enablement requirement." In re Brebner,
455 F.2d 1402, 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1972)).
154. Bayer AG, 301 F.3d at 1310 (U.S. Patent 4,439,620. Notably, the patents do not in-
corporate each other by reference even though the subject matter of the patents was developed
together).
155. Id. at 1315.
156. Id. at 1315-19 (The court attempts to reconcile the DeGeorge claims-only standard
with other cases that applied broader best mode standards, despite the fact that these standards
are incompatible. Specifically, the court appears to reconcile the cases on the basis that cases
decided using a non claims-only standard involved subject matter that "directly impacted" the
invention. Arguably, then the court's new standard also requires disclosure of any subject mat-
ter having a direct impact on the claimed invention).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 1319 (cases where best mode requirement was not satisfied involved "ei-
ther failure to disclose a preferred embodiment, or else failure to disclose a preference that
materially affected making or using the invention").
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In their analysis, the court first observed that the claims included only
the end product ciprofloxacin and not the undisclosed starting material
used in making the claimed invention." 9 Second, the court opined that the
inventor's preferred way of making the intermediate had no material effect
on the properties of the claimed end product.' 6° Then, the court specifically
held that a preferred method of making a claimed invention need not be
disclosed to comply with the best mode requirement, if the preference
does not "materially affect carrying out the invention."' 6' Thus, Bayer did
not apply the DeGeorge claims-only standard but, rather, applied a new
"material effect" standard.
A concurrence to the majority opinion criticized the majority rationale
for further complicating the best mode requirement 62 and opined that the
best mode requirement did not compel disclosure in this case, simply on
the basis that the undisclosed subject matter was an intermediate com-
pound and not a claimed end product compound.' 63 In support, the
concurrence asserted DeGeorge and Brebner as binding precedent for a
scope of the claimed invention rule (i.e. claims-only standard)' 64 and fur-
ther asserted that the CAFC uses a scope of the claimed invention
standard.' 65 While it is true that the CAFC uses such a standard, the CAFC
also applies several other standards-thereby rendering compliance with
the best mode requirement an unreasonably unpredictable exercise. More-
over, DeGeorge and Brebner are not binding precedent for the reason that
Judge Rich's decision in the Nelson case is still valid as to the best mode
issue decided therein and has not been overruled. Finally, the Bayer con-
currence implicitly recognized the broken state of the best mode
requirement in identifying several "imponderable questions" including
"what is the test to identify a best mode--scope of the claimed invention,
necessary relationship to performance of the claimed invention, or mate-
rial effect on the properties of the claimed invention?"' 66 As shown above,
the best mode requirement continues to confound the best minds in patent
law, which proves that the best mode requirement is not so easy to sort out
and is deserving of an en banc hearing to set the record straight.
159. Id. at 1313.
160. Id. at 1321.
161. Id. at 1323 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 1324 (Rader, J., concurring) (stating that the majority "inexplicably and with-
out support in the statute or case law, this Bayer opinion widens its best mode net to capture
the properties of the claimed invention and further sweeps in any material effect or impact on
those properties.").
163. Id. at 1323.
164. Id. at 1326 (discussing the "claimed-scope rule").
165. Id. at 1324.
166. Id. at 1328.
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To summarize, the cases discussed above fit into seven different stan-
dards for assessing the disclosure needed to comply with the best mode
requirement. The standards, which progressively broaden, include the
"claims-only" standard,' 67 the "essentiality" standard, 168 the "essentiality
and novelty" standard,6 9 the "necessity" standard,'7° the "necessary and
nonobvious" standard,'7 ' the "material effect" standard, 72 and the "rela-
tion" standard.'" Again, Diagram 2 of the Appendix should be a helpful
guide in organizing these seven standards. Since there are so many dif-
ferent legal standards being applied, the scope of the best mode
requirement is unsettled and uncertain.
C. Classic Examples of the Paradox
This section illustrates the uncertainty of the scope of the best mode
requirement with two classic examples: software, and chemical treat-
ments. As to the former, it is still Unclear whether computer software
needs to be disclosed in order to satisfy the best mode requirement.
There are contradictory answers to this question, as shown below.
Some courts have ruled in favor of nondisclosure. In re Sherwood
involved a sonogramming apparatus for evaluating seismic activity that
167. See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002); N. Tele-
com Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 215 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Engel Indus., Inc. v.
Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 985 (1987), vacated, 486 U.S. 800
(1988), and transferred to 870 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1989); DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Magdo v. Peltzer, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 838 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Bd. Pat.
Intf. 1981), aff'd in part and vacated in part by Magdo v. Kooi, 699 F.2d 1325 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
168. See Great N. Corp. v. Henry Molded Prod., Inc., 94 F3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In
re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809 (C.C.P.A. 1980); Union Carbide Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 550
F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1977); Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886 (1976); In re Bosy, 360 F.2d 972 (C.C.P.A. 1966); Flick-
Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958
(1966).
169. See Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1109 (2002); Clayton v. Akiba, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 374 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Bd.
Pat. Intf. 1982).
170. See Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 147 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
524 U.S. 1104 (1999); Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Chemcast
Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. P'ship, 860
F.2d 415 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
171. See Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 112 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001); In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled by
In Re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
172. See Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
173. See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002); N. Tele-
com Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 215 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Great N. Corp. v. Henry
Molded Prod., Inc., 94 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Fall 2002]
154 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 9:125
used a large-scale digital computer.'74 A patent examiner rejected the pat-
ent application for failing to disclose any computer hardware, flow
charts, algorithms, or programs. The court, reviewing this rejection,
found the existence of an enabling computer program as of the filing
date of the invention that the applicant had concealed. The court held
that the nondisclosure of this software in the application did not amount
to a best mode violation since the specification provided general mathe-
matical equations and since translation of these equations into machine
language would be a "mere clerical function to a skilled programmer
.... ," In employing this standard, the Sherwood court also concluded
that a specific computer program that was contemplated by the inventor
could be substituted by "the droning use of clerical skill."' 6
Three years later, the CAFC found a broader, enablement violation
in White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc.1
7
There, the inventor disclosed only the name of his proprietary software
that was used to translate a universal numerical control language into
machine code. The CAFC found that the mere reference to the proprie-
tary software was insufficient and that the inventor should have disclosed
the details of the proprietary software to comply with the enablement
requirement. The failure to disclose the software inherently violated the
best mode requirement since it violated the broader enablement require-
ment of which best mode is a partial subset.
In 1997, a panel of the CAFC reversed course again with the deci-
sion in Fonar Corp. v. General Electric Co.7 7 There, the inventor failed
to disclose software details used in a method of magnetic resonance im-
aging. The court ruled that best mode disclosure is satisfied by merely
disclosing the functions of the software. Three months later two of the
three Fonar panelists reinforced their commitment to the Fonar position
in Robotic Vision Systems, Inc. v. View Engineering, Inc. 7 9 There the in-
ventors failed to disclose software in a computer that was connected to
the patented device for receiving input signals and for sending output
signals. The court stated that the existence of software for running the
computer was implicit in the specification, and that the details of any
such software would be within the ordinary skill in the art. No disclosure
was necessary.
174. In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
175. Id. at 817 n.6.
176. Id. at 816.
177. White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F2d 788 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
178. Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 908 (1997).
179. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 112 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001).
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As with software, it is unclear whether details about the chemical
pretreatment of claimed elements are required to comply with the best
mode requirement. In 1988, the CAFC held in Dana, discussed supra,
that disclosure was required regarding a non-claimed chemical pre-
treatment of a claimed material.8 There, a non-claimed fluoridating
surface treatment yielded optimal wear resistance for a claimed rubber
valve-stem seal, but such treatment was not disclosed in the patent
application.' The CAFC invalidated the claims as not complying with
the best mode disclosure requirement.182
In 1998, however, the CAFC reached exactly the opposite decision
on almost identical facts in Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S.
Surgical Corp.'83 There, the inventors failed to disclose a non-claimed
lubricant for pretreating claimed elastomers for improved tear resis-
tance.' 8" The nonclaimed lubricant was necessarily applied to various
seal-forming elastomeric elements including a claimed valve and sep-
tum.' 5 The CAFC upheld the validity of the claims and, thus on nearly
identical facts, the CAFC employed incompatible and contradictory
standards in Dana and in Applied Medical.
From the previous two examples and the preceding section, one can dis-
cern incompatible standards of law used to assess the requisite scope of best
mode disclosure, including the claims-only standard,' the necessity standard,'
180. Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. P'ship, 860 F.2d 415 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
181. Id. at 418.
182. Id. at 419.
183. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 147 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 524 U.S. 1104 (1999).
184. Id. at 1378.
185. Id. at 1379.
186. See N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 215 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cit. 2000); Engel
Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cit. 1987), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 985 (1987), vacated,
486 U.S. 800 (1988), and transferred to 870 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1989); DeGeorge v. Bernier,
768 F.2d 1318, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Boehringer Ingelheim
Corp., 86 F. Supp. 2d 433 (D.N.J. 2000); Magdo v. Peltzer, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 838 (Pat. &
Trademark Off. Bd. Pat. Intf. 1981), aff'd in part and vacated in part by Magdo v. Kooi, 699
F.2d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
187. See Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 147 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
524 U.S. 1104 (1999); Great N. Corp. v. Henry Molded Prod., Inc., 94 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Wahl Instruments, Inc. v.
Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d
923 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. P'ship, 860 F.2d 415 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Ran-
domex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809
(C.C.P.A. 1980); Union Carbide Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 550 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1977);
Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
886 (1976); In re Bosy, 360 F.2d 972 (C.C.P.A. 1966); Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg.
Co., 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
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and various other standards.'" In reviewing the case law, the CCPA and
CAFC have applied the claims-only standard in only four cases whereas
they have applied a broader standard in at least twelve cases. 89 In any
case, the great weight of CAFC cases thus favor use of a standard that is
broader than claims-only.
The incompatibility between the standards is manifested in the fol-
lowing quotes from two of the cases cited above. The CAFC has said,
"[unclaimed] subject matter is not subject to the disclosure requirements
of § 112; the reasons are pragmatic: the disclosure would be boundless,
and the pitfalls endless."' In contrast, the CAFC has also more recently
said "the fact that the use of [something] is not mentioned in the claims
... does not ... exempt such use from the requirements of a best mode
disclosure, since carrying out the invention usually involves more than
what is expressly claimed.""' By now it should be evident that the best
mode cases are irreconcilable on the definition of best mode and with
respect to the standard of requisite scope of best mode disclosure.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A. Generally
The best mode disclosure requirement is currently a disservice to
U.S. patent law because the scope of the disclosure required to comply
therewith is erratically defined by the courts. As explored above, the
phrase "best mode" basically means the inventor's preferred embodiment
and preferred method of making and using that embodiment. The courts,
however, have failed to consistently define and set the scope of the best
mode requirement, such that compliance with the best mode requirement
currently presents a guessing game for patent practitioners and inventors.
Compliance with the best mode requirement is so unclear that it has
repeatedly prompted commentators to call for reform. One pair of com-
mentators have suggested well over a dozen rules for defining the
188. See Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1109 (2002); Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 112 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001); Clayton v. Akiba, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 374 (Pat. &
Trademark Off. Bd. Pat. Intf. 1982); In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled by
In Re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
189. The four cases are DeGeorge, Engel, Northern Telecom, and Teleflex. Arguably,
Christianson is a fifth claims-only case, but the case was transferred away from the CAFC.
Thus, four is probably the correct number.
190. Engel, 946 F.2d at 1531.
191. Robotic Vision, 112 F3d at 1166.
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contours of the best mode requirement, 92 but, unfortunately, a litany of
legal rules would be difficult for even an experienced practitioner to rec-
oncile and apply. And even if such an abundance of legal rules could be
reconciled, it would be appropriate to do so only as a legal exercise by a
patent practitioner and would not be appropriate as a technical exercise
by an inventor. In any case, it is the inventor-not the inventor's attor-
ney-who is accountable for, and in the position to control, the
dissemination of technical best mode details about the invention.'93 The
inventor is not a patent practitioner and should not be required to follow
the litany of legal rules. Instead, what is needed is a single, simple stan-
dard for inventors to rely upon in attempting to comply with their
obligation to disclose the best mode of their invention.
Another commentator noted that the CAFC has inconsistently dealt
with the requisite scope of best mode disclosure and has advocated a
different approach, using a single, bright-line claims-only standard as the
"least troubling" method of ascertaining the required scope of best mode
disclosure.' 94 Just last year, yet another commentator recognized the con-
tinuing inconsistency in the standard of law that plagues the best mode
requirement and similarly recommended use of the claims-only stan-
dard.' 95 Unfortunately, as we have seen, the claims-only standard is too
restrictive, is incompatible with the statutory requirement, and forsakes
the historical basis of the best mode requirement.
Under modern patent jurisprudence since 1952, the required scope
of best mode disclosure has not yet been addressed by the United States
Supreme Court, nor has it ever been addressed by the CAFC sitting en
banc. Thus, there exists a quiver of contradictory standards of law from
which trial and appellate courts can select many different arrows to shoot
at either side of a best mode compliance debate. In other words, the defi-
nition and scope of the best mode requirement remains well unsettled.
The unsettled definition and scope of the best mode disclosure require-
ment weakens U.S. patent enforcement by subjecting inventors to the
costs of overcompliance or risks of undercompliance with the require-
ment.
192. Roy E. Hofer & L. Ann Fitzgerald, New Rules for Old Problems: Defining the Con-
tours of the Best Mode Requirement in Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2309 (Summer 1995).
193. See Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("An
agency relationship may exist during prosecution before the PTO where the patent attorney is
acting on the inventor's behalf .... An agency relationship does not exist, however, with re-
spect to what an inventor must disclose in order to obtain a patent on his invention, which
includes, of course, any best mode under § 112."), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 988 (1995).
194. Christopher S. Marchese, Confusion, Uncertainty, and the Best Mode Requirement,
2 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 66 (Spring 1992).
195. See Franzinger, supra note 35.
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B. Costs of Overcompliance
The costs of overcompliance are relatively straightforward to under-
stand. An inventor will need to spend hours of unproductive time
scouring through documentation of her various development projects to
be sure to include every possible detail related to the invention. Then, the
inventor's attorney will need to spend a commensurate amount of time
sorting out all of the extraneous disclosure and drafting an excessively
and needlessly long patent application, just to be sure to comply with the
most conservative interpretation of the best mode requirement. 1
9 6
C. Risks of Undercompliance
The risks of undercompliance with the requirement are relatively
more complicated. An inventor's failure to understand the definition and
scope of best mode may lead to noncompliance with the requirement and
thereafter 1) denial of the patent grant during patent prosecution, 2) in-
validation of a broad claim, 3) possible invalidation of the entire patent
or patent portfolio, and 4) other state and federal liability.
During prosecution of a patent application, it is possible that the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter "USPTO")
would reject the patent application based on a lack of best mode disclo-
sure. Such rejection, however, is unlikely since the USPTO must assume
that the best mode has been disclosed absent evidence to the contrary.
97
Such evidence, however, might emerge during prosecution of the appli-
cation, perhaps in a technical argument to the examiner, in an affidavit,
or, more likely, based on the new rule that permits an examiner to re-
quest additional information from an inventor.'98 There is one other
remote possibility that an inventor might be denied her patent with re-
gard to best mode disclosure. A foreign inventor might be denied if she
refuses to provide an "indication" of the best mode, as required of for-
eign applications filed via the Patent Cooperation Treaty.'99 This
requirement is probably more a matter of form than substance since it
typically just involves titling the detailed description section of the pat-
ent application with the words "Description of Best Mode".
Interestingly, however, inventors are not supposed to be required to ex-
196. See Marchese, supra note 194, at 61.
197. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2165.03, U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, U.S. Dep't. of Commerce (Original Eighth Edition, August 2001).
198. 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (2000) (describing the requirements for information: "[E]xaminer
... may require the submission ... of ... information as may be reasonably necessary to
properly examine or treat the matter... ).
199. 37 C.F.R. § 1.435(b) (1998) ("In international applications designating the United
States the description must contain upon filing an indication of the best mode contemplated by
the inventor for carrying out the claimed invention.").
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plicitly indicate their best mode.2 0 The more likely situation is that the
examiner will not have access to any solid evidence of a lack of a best
mode, and such a defect would probably lie dormant until litigation or
other adversarial proceedings reveal it during discovery procedures.
During discovery procedures, if alleged infringers discover evidence
that the inventor concealed her best mode, then they will likely be able to
invalidate at least some of her patent claims. The law does not care
whether an inventor has intentionally or unintentionally concealed her
best mode, since an inventor's accidental omission of best mode disclo-
sure will suffice to invalidate the related claims.2°' Alleged infringers
may invalidate claims by discovering evidence in the inventor's lab
notes, e-mail correspondence, drafts of technical papers, etc., in which
the inventor contemplated various modes that were not ultimately dis-
closed in her patent application. Also, the alleged infringers can elicit
similar verbal testimony under oath at a deposition or on the stand at
trial. Regrettably for the inventor, the best mode issue is a question of
fact, potentially in front of a jury at trial. There, the alleged infringers
can parade details in front of the jury relating to the various undisclosed
modes from the inventor's documentation of her development project.
Unfortunately, all that the alleged infringers may need to do to invalidate
a targeted claim is to get sympathy from the jury that the inventor knew
much more about carrying out the invention than the inventor disclosed
in her patent application. A jury may well believe that the invention
works better with the undisclosed information and that there is no way
that the inventor could not have contemplated that fact, and thus find
against the inventor. From a patentee's perspective, what could be
worse?
For starters, the alleged infringers could render the entire patent
unenforceable because the inventor neglected to include details that
affected each and every claim in the patent. The stakes get higher if the
alleged infringers produce convincing evidence of inequitable conduct
by the inventor, after which the inventor's entire patent or patent
portfolio can be rendered invalid. 22 This guilt-by-association rule arises
if the inventor is found to have intentionally, rather than just accidentally,
200. See Emsthausen v. Nakayama, I U.S.P.Q.2d 1539, 1549 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter.
1985) ("There is no requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112 that an applicant point out which of his
embodiments he considers his best mode").
201. See DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Not complying
with best mode requirements amounts to concealing the preferred mode contemplated by the
applicant at the time of filing.); see also Union Carbide Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 550 F.2d
355 (6th Cir. 1977).
202. See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l, Ltd., 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(stating that related patents being enforced in the same cause of action are subject to being
held unenforceable).
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concealed the best mode. At this point, the inventor will also be
accountable for the adversary's attorney's fees.2 3
Worse yet, the inventor's inequitable conduct may bring about other
state and federal charges. Any person-not just the alleged infringer-
who is injured by the inventor's willful inequitable conduct concerning
highly material information may sue the inventor under state unfair
competition laws or federal antitrust laws under which an inventor can
be exposed to treble damages.2° Also, the inventor's willful, inequitable
conduct in procuring a patent may also amount to a Federal Trade Com-
mission violation.20 ' From the above, one can see that there are many
significant risks in failing to fully disclose the best mode of an invention.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
From the discussion above, it should be clear that the current condi-
tion of the best mode requirement is unacceptably unpredictable, and
thereby leads to unreasonable costs and risks in U.S. patent law. There-
fore, at the next available opportunity the CAFC should remedy the
problems with the best mode requirement, via a ruling en banc. In the
alternative, the best mode requirement should be sacrificed and used as a
bargaining chip during future negotiations to harmonize international
patent law. In the meantime, however, inventors are well advised to
"overcomply" with the best mode requirement since the risks of under-
compliance far outweigh the costs of overcompliance.
A. Judicially Repair the Broken Best Mode Requirement
The best mode disclosure requirement needs to be completely revis-
ited in definition and scope by the CAFC sitting en banc since it is
subject to the unpredictable application of a flawed two-step analysis
and too many conflicting standards of law. The definition of best mode
and the scope of best mode disclosure are not at all settled. Such unpre-
dictability permits courts to employ at will a variety of contradictory and
incompatible standards of law.
The Chemcast two-step analysis is flawed because both prongs are
impractical. The first prong asks whether the inventor contemplated a
203. See Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Pres. Sys., Inc., 922 F.2d 801, 804 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
204. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175-
76(1965).
205. See Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct in Patent
Procurement: A Nutshell, A Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for Modest
Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 306 n. 134 (1997).
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best mode. The practical reality of inventing is such that the answer to
the first prong is probably always affirmative. It is difficult to imagine a
situation where an inventor does not at least passively contemplate some
better or best mode of her invention at the time of filing. For example, in
the case where an inventor has only one mode, that one mode is neces-
sarily the best because there is no other, and surely the presence of one
mode is better than no mode at all. In the case where the inventor has
multiple modes, it is hard to imagine a scientist, engineer, technician, or
tinkerer that has absolutely no opinion at all as to which of her discov-
ered modes is better than the others. Speaking from experience,
inventors are, by their very nature, analytical folks who tend to overana-
lyze the pros and cons of different variations of their inventive subject
matter as they develop their invention. Hence the familiar phrase arose
that during project development there inevitably comes a time to "shoot
the engineer." This is because the engineer is constantly assessing the
value of the invention, tweaking it, and is thus continuously seeking bet-
ter and better modes of her invention. Thus, the real world answer to the
first inquiry is probably always yes, and therefore the first inquiry should
be abolished, or at least deemed presumptively met to be rebutted by an
alleged infringer.
The second prong of the Chemcast test is basically circular since it
confuses the relationship between enablement and its partial subset, best
mode. The second prong asks whether the disclosure is adequate to en-
able one skilled in the art to practice the best mode. In light of the
contrasts described in Section III, particularly between mode and en-
ablement and between mode and embodiment, it would be more accurate
to ask a different question. That is, whether the disclosure accurately
teaches one of ordinary skill in the art what the :inventor considers to be
the best manner of making and using what the inventor considers to be
her best embodiment. To correct these problems, the CAFC sitting en
banc should replace the Chemcast analysis with the preceding inquiry, or
with some other analysis that is consistent with the statutory disclosure
provision.
The claims-only standard is also flawed because it does not square
with the plain language interpretation of the statute as was discussed
above. Best mode means the manner in which something is done to yield
the greatest usefulness intended, which is necessarily broader than just
those elements explicitly claimed. As we have confirmed previously, en-
ablement disclosure is not limited to the scope of the claims. To fully
enable an invention, many non-claimed details often must be disclosed,
such as special tools and special methods of making the invention. As
shown in Diagram 1 of the Appendix, best mode is a partial subset of
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enablement and, like enablement, best mode compliance requires disclo-
sure of non-claimed details.
Moreover, the claims-only approach requires an inventor to predict
and construe the scope of the claims. Again, inventors, not attorneys are
ultimately responsible for compliance with the best mode requirement.
In other words, the inventor has to know what is within the scope of the
claims to know what to disclose to comply with the best mode require-
ment. Since inventors are not typically equipped to perform claim
construction, it is unfair and illogical to hold them accountable for doing
so.
The necessity standard is not perfect, but it better comports with the
plain language interpretation of the best mode requirement and is the
majority rule in a vast number of the best mode cases that assess the req-
uisite scope of the best mode requirement. Like the plain language
definition of best mode, the necessity standard involves subject matter
outside the scope of the claims whereas the claims-only standard inher-
ently does not. The majority standard applied in the cases cited herein is
the collective necessity/essentiality standard. °6 For all intents and pur-
poses, the term "essential" is close enough in definition to the term
"necessary" for the essentiality and necessity standards to be combined.
After all, "essential" is defined as "basic, indispensable" and "neces-
sary".'27 Therefore, the claims-only standard should be permanently set
aside in favor of the necessity standard or some qualified version of the
necessity standard.
B. Or, Legislatively Sacrifice Best Mode as
a Harmonization Bargaining Chip
If higher judicial authority is unable to remedy the problems with the
best mode disclosure requirement, then perhaps the legislature should
sacrifice the requirement as a bargaining chip during future negotiations
to harmonize international patent laws. There may be nothing to lose in
such a case since the current state of best mode is a great disservice to
U.S. patent law. If, however, the CAFC or the Supreme Court elected to
remedy the unstable and unpredictable best mode requirement, then the
public stands to benefit therefrom.
From a "marketing" perspective, the best mode requirement is un-
popular. Many foreign jurisdictions do not have a best mode
206. See supra Section IV.C.
207. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 396 (10th ed. 2002) (defining the
term "essential"), available at http://www.m-w.com.
208. See Jerry R. Selinger, In Defense of "Best Mode": Preserving the Benefit of the
Bargain for the Public, 43 CATH. U.L. REV. 1071 (1994).
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requirement, including the European Patent Office and Japan. Thus,
many foreign "customers" of the USPTO would undoubtedly prefer to
abolish the best mode requirement. Likewise many domestic "custom-
ers" and "agents" of the USPTO have already explicitly advocated the
abolishment of the best mode requirement, including the Intellectual
Property Owners Association and the American Intellectual Property
Lawyer's Association.10 Between these foreign and domestic "custom-
ers" lies perhaps the largest customer base of the USPTO. As the old
adage goes, "the customer is always right," and so what the customer
wants, the customer tends to get. Therefore, regardless of the merits of
abandoning the best mode requirement, we should probably expect to
see it abolished. 2'° The very least we can do, however, is to preserve the
best mode requirement long enough to use it as leverage during negotia-
tion with other countries during patent harmonization efforts. In other
words, the best mode requirement could be surrendered to protect a pos-
sibly more treasured aspect of U.S. patent law, such as the first-to-file
concept.
Perhaps, however, not all would be lost in giving up the best mode
requirement since there remain strong, inherent incentives for inventors
to disclose their best mode. First, as Professor Chisum has noted, "[t]he
priority rules on patent rights create ample incentives for inventors to
disclose valuable 'best modes,' even if there were no best mode require-
ment., 21 ' There is also an ever-present danger in omitting any mode,
particularly your best, which has commercial value. This is because a
competitor can later file an application covering the specific omitted




Nonetheless, for giving up such significant consideration in the US pat-
ent bargain, not to mention centuries of legal effort and evolution in
refining the best mode requirement, we would be remiss if we didn't re-
place it with stricter scrutiny of compliance with other statutory
disclosure requirements.
209. See Request for Comments on the International Effort to Harmonize the Substantive
Requirements of Patent Laws, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,409 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, March 12, 2001); see also Comments Regarding the International Effort
to Harmonize the Substantive Requirements of Patent Laws (May 2001) (responding to the
above cited request for comments) at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/harmoni-
zation/.
210. See Franzinger, supra note 35, at 181.
211. Chisum, supra note 205, at 318 n. 186; see also Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc.,
301 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., concurring) (proffering that the best mode
requirement is self-enforcing).
212. Chisum, supra note 205, at 318 n.186; BayerAG, 301 E3d at 1325.
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C. Meanwhile, How to Comply with the Requirement
to Ensure Patent Reliability
Until the problems with best mode are corrected or the requirement
beneficially sacrificed, inventoes should err on the side of excessive dis-
closure to avoid having their patent invalidated for noncompliance with
the best mode requirement. In other words, despite the increased costs of
doing so, inventors should overcomply with the best mode requirement
to be sure that an alleged infringer couldn't show a jury the litany of dif-
ferences between the inventor's project documentation and her patent
application disclosure. Any differences give a court an opportunity to
exploit the uncertainty in the law against the inventor. The following
general and specific recommendations are aimed at suggesting how best
to comply with best mode disclosure requirement for maximum patent
enforcement reliability, despite the unsettled situation of the law.
Generally, a prospective patentee should first ask herself what she
has to lose and what she has to gain by not disclosing all documented
details related to her invention. At worst, and as discussed above in Sec-
tion V, a patentee could potentially be found guilty of violating federal
law if she intentionally concealed her best mode. At best, she might pre-
serve for herself a trade secret, but the disclosure in the patent might
facilitate a competitor to detect the best mode anyway, thereby defeating
the purpose of concealing the trade secret. Thus, although the costs to
overcomply are high, the risks in undercomplying are even higher and
the opportunities uncertain in not thoroughly disclosing all documented
details in the patent application.
And so, a patentee should not be coy or conservative in communicat-
ing the documented details of her invention. As a rule of thumb, if an
inventor has documented a detail relating to her invention, she should
disclose it, regardless if it is a detail within the ordinary skill in the art.
Even under the broader necessity standard, an inventor need not identify
every last detail, but if she has documented the detail she would be wise
to disclose it, since an alleged infringer will probably discover it during
litigation and attempt to show it to a jury. An inventor should disclose all
the details that she has and tell her attorney what she thinks she wants
protected since the attorney should be able to discern through an inter-
view what details should be protected. If an inventor has concerns about
elements of trade secrecy, she should explicitly raise this issue with her
attorney.
Disclosing all of the documented details of an invention may take
extra time, but should not entail any capital expense. Compliance does
not require testing or elaborate investigative work. It merely requires an
inventor to share such information to the extent that she already contem-
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plates it and that it teaches a better way of carrying out the invention. All
it may cost is a little lengthier disclosure of information that an inventor
already has, but is now obligated to share.
More specifically, what follows are some fairly reliable rules of
thumb for a patentee to consider when drafting a disclosure document.
First, there is no affirmative obligation to disclose a specific working
example.23 As one court put it, "the absence of a specific working exam-
ple is not necessarily evidence that the best mode has not been disclosed,
nor is the presence of one evidence that it has. 2t4 Accordingly, a patentee
need not expend any extra efforts to develop a product or process spe-
cifically to satisfy the best mode requirement.
Second, a patentee should always disclose the source of their materi-
als, processes, and equipment used in carrying out the invention. Sources
include names of suppliers, distributors, trade names, product numbers,
etc. If a patentee chooses and documents a particular source of a material
of the invention, it is hard to argue that the patentee did not contemplate
that source as the best alternative or at least that the patentee preferred
the source.
As a fun example, assume that an inventor has just developed an ap-
paratus for removing acid deposits from terminal posts of a car battery.
Assume also that the inventor discovered during project development
that using a carbonated soft drink yields better results. More specifically,
a cola, namely Coca-Cola®,25 yields the best results. Therefore, the pat-
entee would be required to identify the use of any generic cola to satisfy
the enablement requirement and to more specifically identify Coke®26 to
satisfy the best mode requirement. The inventor would not, however, be
required to disclose the Coke® chemical formula.1 7 So, even if the
Coca-Cola® company were the patentee they would be able to preserve
the trade secrecy of their secret formula.
Third, a patentee should plan the timing of her development,
disclosure, and application for a patent very carefully. A patentee need
only disclose those best mode details known to her at the time of filing
her patent application, and not thereafter, since a patentee need not
update her application with a later-discovered best mode.21 8 Simply put,
213. See In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
214. In re Honn, 364 F.2d 454 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
215. Coca-Cola® is a registered trademark of The Coca-Cola Company.
216. Coke® is a registered trademark of The Coca-Cola Company.
217. See generally Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 E2d 585 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that the disclosure of the trade name, but not the formula, of a cleaning solution used in
the claimed invention was sufficient for best mode purposes); see also Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v.
Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886 (1976).
218. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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if an inventor does not have best mode details as of filing, then she
cannot be held accountable for disclosing them. If an inventor wants to
avoid disclosing certain best mode details, then she should avoid
discovering and developing such details until after filing her patent
application. Similarly, if an inventor does not want to share the results of
testing of her invention, then she should not test it until after filing her
patent application. After filing her application and developing better
modes, she should re-evaluate whether she wants to patent those modes
or preserve them as trade secrets. As authority for this third rule of
thumb, Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd. is precedent for purposely, but
legally, circumventing the best mode requirement." 9
Finally, an inventor should not develop improvements to her inven-
tion between the time when she reviews and signs off on the application
and when the application is filed. If an inventor plans to maintain any
further development refinements as trade secrets, it is especially impor-
tant to break off all development of her invention during the preparation
of her patent application, i.e., between the time she discloses her initial
invention to her patent attorney and the time the application is filed. On-
going development documentation of improvements to your initial
invention during that time may be difficult or impossible to timely cap-
ture in the patent application and thus may be a smoking gun for an
opponent to uncover during discovery. The following example illustrates
some of the problems described above.
In Graco, Inc. v. Binks Manufacturing Co., joint inventors invented a
first patent application covering an improved industrial pump. 220 Before
filing the first patent application, one of the joint inventors invented an
improved seal for the pump and requested the preparation of a second
patent application covering a further improved pump using the improved
seal.22' Neither inventor disclosed the improved seal in the first patent
application but waited until the filing of the second application to dis-
close it. This is a classic best mode violation, simply because the
inventors were obligated to disclose the improved seal in the first pump
patent application since it was known to them as of the filing date of
their application. Incidentally, an inventor's failure to disclose the best
mode cannot be cured after filing the application."22
Here are few other miscellaneous observations on complying with
the best mode requirement. 1) If an invention requires any kind of re-
219. See Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding no obli-
gation on assignee to share knowledge of optimum details with inventor), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 988 (1995).
220. 60 F.3d 785 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
221. Id. at 787.
222. See In re Hay, 534 F.2d 917 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
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finement techniques, such as calibration or initialization routines, then it
is wise to disclose them even if such procedures are known in the art.
Chances are, such tweaking techniques inherently permit better opera-
tion of the invention and are thus susceptible to best mode scrutiny. 2) It
is not settled whether best mode disclosure is limited only to embodi-
ments, and the methods of making and using those embodiments. In
other words, best mode disclosure may be subject to how the invention is
best employed. For example, assume that an inventor contemplates at the
time of filing her application that her internal combustion engine runs
best using gasoline and it is best employed as a power plant for generat-
ing electricity rather than as a prime mover of an automobile.
Employment of her invention may be viewed as a subset of a manner of
using her invention and she may be obligated to disclose such employ-
ment.
VII. SUMMARY
The definition of the best mode requirement of U.S. patent law is
unclear and the scope unstable. Instability in the scope of the best mode
requirement leads to great expenses incurred in overcomplying with the
statute and to even greater risks in undercomplying with the statute.
Such unnecessary expenses and risks are a great disservice to the patent
system. Therefore, the best mode requirement desperately needs to be
stabilized by an en banc ruling of the CAFC. In the alternative, the best
mode requirement should be beneficially sacrificed as a bargaining chip
during negotiations with other countries in furtherance of international
patent law harmonization efforts. In the meantime, however, inventors
are advised to disclose everything important enough to have been docu-
mented during the project development phase of their invention process.
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BEST MODE: THE INTERSECTION OF THE DESCRIPTION
AND ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENTS
.. tten Description Of
Best Mode
DIAGRAM 2
SCOPE OF STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING THE REQUISITE DISCLOSURE
TO SATISFY THE BEST MODE REQUIREMENT
*Cases where the court identified one standard as law, but applied a
different standard to the facts.
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